FORE:Only because these wretched people had not promptly obeyed the order of the military to march against the fort in front of the soldiers, Vivignes had been punished, and that morning over forty of the best houses had been set on fire.As to the proofs of divine agency derived from divination, they are both irrational and weak. If all things are pre153determined by God��s providence, knowledge of the future is useless, and, therefore, cannot have been given to us. Moreover, no confidence can be placed in the alleged fulfilments of prophecy; probably most of them are fictitious and the remainder accidental. For the rest, good luck is distributed without regard to merit; and the general corruption of mankind shows that, from the Stoic point of view, human nature is a complete failure.249

FORE:Ordinary machinery, on the reverse, is stationary, generally consumes a regular amount of power, is not subjected to such uncertain strains, and as a rule acts without its operation being controlled by the will of attendants.We cannot, then, agree with those critics who attribute to Aristotle a recognition of such things as ��laws of nature,�� in the sense of uniform co-existences and sequences.279 Such an idea implies a certain balance and equality between subject and predicate which he would never have admitted. It would, in his own language, be making relation, instead of substance, the leading category. It must be remembered also that he did not acknowledge the existence of those constant conjunctions in Nature which we call laws. He did not admit that all matter was heavy, or that fluidity implied the presence of heat. The possession of constant properties, or rather of a single constant property��circular rotation��is reserved for the aether. Nor is this a common property of different and indefinitely multipliable phenomena; it characterises a single body, measurable in extent and unique in kind. Moreover,386 we have something better than indirect evidence on this point; we have the plain statement of Aristotle himself, that all science depends on first principles, about which it is impossible to be mistaken, precisely because they are universal abstractions not presented to the mind by any combination,280��a view quite inconsistent with the priority now given to general laws.