TWO:By assuming this or any other well-proved example, and estimating larger or smaller shafts by keeping their diameters as the cube root of the power to be transmitted, the distance between bearings as the diameter, and the speed inverse as the diameter, the reader will find his calculations to agree approximately with the modern practice of our best engineers. This is not mentioned to give proportions for shafts, so much as to call attention to accidental strains, such as winding belts, and to call attention to a marked discrepancy between actual practice and such proportions as would be given by what has been called the measured or determinable strains to which shafts are subjected.
TWO:"Certainly, certainly, sir! Exactly because we hear so many lies from foreign countries about the Germans, I want to try and find out the truth for myself."With the Epicurean theory of Justice, the distortion, already sufficiently obvious, is carried still further; although we must frankly admit that it includes some aper?us strikingly in advance of all that had hitherto been written on the subject. Justice, according to our philosopher, is neither an internal balance of the souls faculties, nor a rule imposed by the will70 of the stronger, but a mutual agreement to abstain from aggressions, varying from time to time with the varying interests of society, and always determined by considerations of general utility.141 This is excellent: we miss, indeed, the Stoic idea of a common humanity, embracing, underlying, and transcending all particular contracts; but we have, in exchange, the idea of a general interest equivalent to the sum of private interests, together with the means necessary for their joint preservation; and we have also the form under which the notion of justice originates, though not the measure of its ultimate expansion, which is regard for the general interest, even when we are not bound by any contract to observe it. But when we go on to ask why contracts should be adhered to, Epicurus has no reason to offer beyond dread of punishment. His words, as translated by Mr. Wallace, are:Injustice is not in itself a bad thing, but only in the fear arising from anxiety on the part of the wrong-doer that he will not always escape punishment.142 This was evidently meant for a direct contradiction of Platos assertion, that, apart from its penal consequences, injustice is a disease of the soul, involving more mischief to the perpetrator than to the victim. Mr. Wallace, however, takes a different view of his authors meaning. According to him,
