Socrates, then, did not create the cross-examining elenchus, but he gave it two new and very important applications. So far as we can make out, it had hitherto been only used (again, after the example of the law-courts) for the purpose of detecting error or intentional deceit. He made it an instrument for introducing his own convictions into the minds of others, but so that his interlocutors seemed to be discovering them for themselves, and were certainly learning how, in their turn, to practise the same didactic interrogation on a future occasion. And he also used it for the purpose of logical self-discipline in a manner which will be139 presently explained. Of course, Socrates also employed the erotetic method as a means of confutation, and, in his hands, it powerfully illustrated what we have called the negative moment of Greek thought. To prepare the ground for new truth it was necessary to clear away the misconceptions which were likely to interfere with its admission; or, if Socrates himself had nothing to impart, he could at any rate purge away the false conceit of knowledge from unformed minds, and hold them back from attempting difficult tasks until they were properly qualified for the undertaking. For example, a certain Glauco, a brother of Plato, had attempted to address the public assembly, when he was not yet twenty years of age, and was naturally quite unfitted for the task. At Athens, where every citizen had a voice in his countrys affairs, obstruction, whether intentional or not, was very summarily dealt with. Speakers who had nothing to say that was worth hearing were forcibly removed from the bma by the police; and this fate had already more than once befallen the youthful orator, much to the annoyance of his friends, who could not prevail on him to refrain from repeating the experiment, when Socrates took the matter in hand. One or two adroit compliments on his ambition drew Glauco into a conversation with the veteran dialectician on the aims and duties of a statesman. It was agreed that his first object should be to benefit the country, and that a good way of achieving this end would be to increase its wealth, which, again, could be done either by augmenting the receipts or by diminishing the expenditure. Could Glauco tell what was the present revenue of Athens, and whence it was derived?No; he had not studied that question.Well then, perhaps, he had some useful retrenchments to propose.No; he had not studied that either. But the State might, he thought, be enriched at the expense of its enemies.A good idea, if we can be sure of beating them first! Only, to avoid the risk of attacking somebody who is stronger than ourselves, we must140 know what are the enemys military resources as compared with our own. To begin with the latter: Can Glauco tell how many ships and soldiers Athens has at her disposal?No, he does not at this moment remember.Then, perhaps, he has it all written down somewhere?He must confess not. So the conversation goes on until Socrates has convicted his ambitious young friend of possessing no accurate information whatever about political questions.90
Director
There was no chewing gum in the craft!Politeness is as indispensable to a learner in a machine shop as it is to a gentleman in society. The character of the courtesy may be modified to suit the circumstances and the person, but still it is courtesy. An apprentice may understand differential calculus, but a workman may understand how to bore a steam cylinder; and in the workman's estimation a problem in calculus is a trivial thing to understand compared with the boring of a steam engine cylinder. Under these circumstances, if a workman is not allowed to balance some of his knowledge against politeness, an apprentice is placed at a disadvantage.The concessions to common sense and to contemporary schools of thought, already pointed out in those Dialogues which we suppose to have been written after the Republic, are still more conspicuous in the Laws. We do not mean merely the project of a political constitution avowedly offered as the best possible in existing circumstances, though not the best absolutely; but we mean that there is throughout a desire to present philosophy from its most intelligible, practical, and popular side. The extremely rigorous standard of sexual morality (p. 838) seems, indeed, more akin to modern than to ancient notions, but it was in all probability borrowed from the naturalistic school of ethics, the forerunner of Stoicism; for not only is there a direct appeal to Natures teaching in that connexion; but throughout the entire work the terms nature and naturally occur with greater frequency, we believe, than in all the rest of Platos writings put together. When, on the other hand, it is asserted that men can be governed by no other motive than pleasure (p. 663, B), we seem to see in this declaration a concession to the Cyrenaic school, as well as a return to the forsaken standpoint of the Protagoras. The increasing influence of Pythagoreanism is shown by271 the exaggerated importance attributed to exact numerical determinations. The theory of ideas is, as Prof. Jowett observes, entirely absent, its place being taken by the distinction between mind and matter.159IX.Need I say that I did all I could to make the woman a little more reasonable, and make her understand that it would not do to let a child of ten walk by itself from Lige to Maastricht, and least of all in these dire times. But I could not make her see this, and this instance proves all the more, perhaps, how upset the inhabitants of Lige were that morning; they were nearly out of their senses for fear.These four types comprehend the motive-power in general use at the present day. In considering different engines for motive-power in a way to best comprehend their nature, the first view to be taken is that they are all directed to the same end, and all deal with the same power; and in this way avoid, if possible, the impression of there being different kinds of power, as the terms water-power, steam-power, and so on, seem to imply. We speak of steam-power, water-power, or wind-power; but power is the same from whatever source derived, and these distinctions merely indicate different natural sources from which power is derived, or the different means employed to utilise and apply it.